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One side-effect of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09 
was the resurgence of a debate over exchange rates. The 
conventional wisdom dictates that real-exchange rate 
adjustments are needed in order to bring about changes 
in trade balances across countries. However, the literature 
on the effect of exchange rate fluctuations and currency 
under-valuations on exports is surprisingly ambiguous. 
This note explores for the first time the potential role 
of foreign direct investment as an intermediate variable 
in the process of trade adjustment after large real-
exchange rate changes. Real-exchange rate devaluations 
might result in increases in foreign direct investment 
inflows, as investors can take advantage of changes in 
the foreign-currency value of domestic assets. If so, 
the response of exports will depend to some extent on 
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the nature of such foreign direct investment inflows, 
with inflows motivated by “horizontal” foreign direct 
investment associated with negligible changes in export 
growth after devaluation. The author utilizes quarterly 
data on real effective exchange rates, foreign direct 
investment inflows and exports to explore the effects 
of large devaluations (defined as the largest observed 
quarterly real effective exchange rate devaluation) on 
foreign direct investment and exports from 1990 to 
2010. The admittedly speculative evidence suggests 
that there were heterogeneous experiences regarding the 
timing and magnitude of subsequent changes in foreign 
direct investment and exports, but on average foreign 
direct investment inflows tended to precede export surges 
within two year horizons.  
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One side-effect of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was the resurgence of a debate over exchange 
rates, particularly insofar as they are related to the so-called global imbalances and their role in prompting 
the crisis.
2 The conventional wisdom is that real-exchange rate adjustments are needed in order to bring 
about changes in trade balances across countries. However, the literature on the effect of exchange rate 
fluctuations and currency under -valuations  on exports  is  surprisingly  ambiguous about the  effect of 
exchange-rate fluctuations on exports.  
Indeed, there are two literatures whose marriage might help shed  further light on the effect of exchange-
rate fluctuations on exports. One concerns the effect of exchange rates on exports, with some evidence  
and theories pointing to small or diluted effects of exchange rate changes on exports. The literatures on 
the pass-through of exchange rate changes  into import prices and another on the role of exchange -rate 
undervaluation on growth provide some relevant insights. However, there is also a literature on “FDI fire 
sales,” which attempts to explain why inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) tend to rise even amid 
currency  crises  or  devaluations.  In  a  sense,  this  note  brings  these  two  strands  of  the  international 
economics literature together and provides preliminary evidence suggesting that the FDI fire sale effect 
could be seen as an intermediate mechanism that affects the magnitude of the export surge after real 
exchange rate adjustments. That is, if FDI increases after devaluations, then the rise of exports might 
depend  to  some  extent  on  whether  FDI  inflows  are  driven  by  a  desire  to  establish  a  footing  for 
multinational corporations to supply the host (domestic) market or for exporting goods or services to 
other destinations.
3  
The admittedly speculative empirical exercises discussed in this note began with the identification of  
episodes of the largest quarterly real exchange-rate devaluations for each country during 1990-2010. In 
turn, the analysis  describes the behavior of FDI inflows and exports two years before and after each 
devaluation  episode,  classifying  each episode in terms of whether they resulted in  abnormally high 
increases in FDI (e.g., whether the change in FDI was higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution of 
a country’s observed changes in FDI during the sample period) or abnormally high increases in exports, 
and whether the surge in FDI occurred before, during or after the export surge.   The data cover 60 
devaluation episodes, of which 50 percent were characterized by FDI surges that preceded or occurred 
simultaneously  with  export  surges.  Furthermore,  regression  analysis  suggests  that  the  magnitude  of 
devaluations tended to affect the magnitude of the change in FDI, especially among developing countries, 
which in turn were associated with the magnitude of the change in exports. Hence it appears that increases 
in FDI are associated with subsequent increases in exports, but devaluations per se do not appear  to 
statistically precede export surges after large devaluations. However, exports do appear to be correlated 
with subsequent FDI inflows.  
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews related literatures. Section III 
covers the data, and the stylized facts concerning the behavior of FDI and exports before and after these 
large devaluations are presented in Section IV. In turn, section V presents speculative regressions that 
                                                           
2 See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010), Caballero (2010), and Suominen (2010).  
3 In the FDI literature, the former type of FDI has been coined “horizontal” whereas the latter has been described as 
“vertical,” because it tends to utilize cheaper factors or domestic inputs to assemble exports for other destinations – 
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) is the seminal article on these topics.   
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attempt to link changes in REERs, FDI and exports before and after the identified devaluations. Section 
VI concludes.  
II. Related Literatures 
This  note  is  related  to  various  literatures.  The  linchpin  is  the  role  of  changes  in  exchange  rates  in 
determining both trade flows, especially exports, and FDI. As will become apparent, these literatures are 
deep, but as far as I know, there are not contributions that focus on both exports and FDI simultaneously.  
  A. The “Pass Through” Literature 
An important literature has focused on the price mechanism that would operate if exchange-rate changes 
are to have an impact on international trade flows. That is, such changes must have an effect on prices 
observed  by  consumers,  which  then  affect  consumption  choices.  However,  the  literature  remains 
dominated  by  low  pass  through  estimates.  In  their  literature  survey,  Goldberg  and  Knetter  (1997) 
concluded that that a typical estimated elasticity of local goods prices with respect to exchange rate 
changes is close to one-half in U.S. data, but the elasticity varies across industries. Such a low elasticity 
relative to the Law of One Price prediction of unity is possibly due to errors in variables, the increasing 
utilization  of  imported  inputs  (intermediate  goods)  in  domestic  production,  and,  more  importantly, 
monopolistic competition and the existence of markups above marginal production costs by firms selling 
differentiated manufactured goods. Hence Goldberg and Knetter called for further research on the nature 
of markups, thus linking the macro and trade literatures to the literature on industrial organization on 
pricing to market behavior. More recent contributions have also found relatively low pass-through from 
exchange rate changes into local prices, with the low pass through persisting over time (see, for example, 
Gopinath and Rigobon 2008, and Campa and Goldberg 2005). For our purposes, it suffices to say that 
exchange-rate devaluations might not yield export surges when firms opt to increase markups through 
pricing to market.  
Notwithstanding the evidence on imperfect pass-through, the existence of fixed costs of exporting can 
lead to persistent effects of exchange rate devaluations on exports as new exporting firms overcome entry 
costs in the aftermath of devaluation but the absence of fixed costs of exit imply that firms do not 
necessarily  exit  from  exporting  even  after  the  exchange  rate  appreciates,  thus  causing  hysteresis  in 
exports. This was the argument of the seminal papers by Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman 
(1989).  Dixit (1989) modeled a firm’s decision to become an exporter as a financial option, due to the 
uncertainty over the value of the exchange rate over time. In his model, firms’ option value of exporting 
rises with exchange-rate uncertainty. In any case, the key point of this literature was that asymmetric costs 
of entry into and exit from exporting are likely to be associated with long-lasting effects of devaluations 
on exports. Evidence from case studies of developing economies reported by Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
suggested that episodes of export booms were associated with many firms entering export activities while 
incumbent exporters tended not to increase their exports in response to devaluations. Similarly, Freund 
and Pierola (2008) analyzed over ninety episodes of manufactured “export surges” and concluded that 
export surges in developing (but not in developed) economies were associated with large real exchange-




4 Campa (2004) found that export growth associated with hysteresis driven by the extensive 
margin of trade was small in a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms , which is consistent with Freund 
and  Pierola’s  finding  that  persistent  devaluations  are  not  associated  with export  surges  in  developed 
economies.  New  research  examining  French  firms  in  light  of  exchange-rate  changes  suggests  that 
responses can vary across firms, with high-productivity firms or firms that sell high-quality goods tending 
to raise markups during depreciations while low productivity firms tend to raise their export volumes 
(Berman, Martin and Meyer 2009). Hence it seems that overall it is difficult to expect huge impacts of 
exchange rate devaluations on exports, at least for certain types of countries, because the pass through can 
be attenuated by strategic pricing behavior while the extensive margin effect tends to be small.  
  B. Currency Under-valuation, Exports and Growth 
As  mentioned,  Freund  and  Pierola  (2008)  found  that  exchange  rate  devaluations  that  resulted  in 
significant  under-valuation  of  developing-country  currencies  were  associated  with  export  surges  in 
developing countries, based on an examination of 92 episodes of export surges (instead of episodes of 
REER adjustments). To some extent, these results might be driven by the research design: the authors 
first identified the episodes of manufactured exports surges and then explored correlates of the magnitude 
of the export growth rate, but they did not ask whether the probability of observing an export surge is 
partially correlated with real exchange rate fluctuations. In contrast, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2005)  did  find  that  the  probability  of  observing  a  sustained  and  large  GDP  growth  episode  was 
associated  with real  devaluations.  Nonetheless, the fact  that  episodes of  sustained  devaluations  were 
systematically correlated with both the size of the export surge and the number of new exported products 
in Freund and Pierola (2008) is an interesting result. As will become apparent, the ongoing shares some 
methodological  aspects  with  the  event-study  approach,  but  our  focus  is  on  episodes  of  large  real 
exchange-rate devaluations and the performance of FDI and total merchandise exports before and after 
devaluations.
5  
In any case, it is worth mentioning other contributions that examine the link the between exchange rates 
and economic growth.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1997) found that an indicator of exchange -rate 
undervaluation is associated with higher subsequent GDP per capita growth rates, but surprisingly do not 
argue that this finding works through exports, but rather that  it works via capital accumulation. This 
finding is thus more tightly related to the literature on exchange rates and FDI reviewed below.  Rodrik 
(2008) is perhaps the most complete assessment of the role of under-valued exchange rates in promoting 
economic growth. The author argued that exports can be hampered by market (coordination) failures, 
currency under-valuation can provide an impetus to exports and overcome said obstacles, and hence they 
are associated with faster growth.  However, the statistical wor k presented by Rodrik is far from 
conclusive regarding the expected link between exchange rate under-valuation and exports as the primary 
                                                           
4 Freund and Pierola (2008, p. 3) define an export surge as “a significant and sustained increase in manufacturing 
export growth from one 7-year period to the next 7-year period.”   
5 Freund and Pierola (2008) cite Freund (2005) and Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) as pre -existing studies 
that use the episodes approach. However, event studies have a long tradition in economics – see the literature review 
by MacKinlay (1997), which cites studies from the 1930s. The latter emphasizes the use of events as a determinant 
of economic and financial variables. That is, for example, events of news concerning firms can affect firm-specific 
stock market valuations. In a sense, this approach was meant to identify treatment effects and test whether outcomes 
before and after were significantly affected by the event or treatment. Our extremely preliminary empirical exercises 
follow the spirit of this earlier literature.   
5 
 
mechanism linking such policies to subsequent economic growth, relying primarily on the econometric 
evidence presented in Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005).  
C. Exchange Rates and FDI 
Another literature analyzes the link between exchange rates and FDI. One strand has focused on an 
empirical regularity, namely that FDI seems to rise during and after severe balance of payments crises. 
Krugman (2000) was perhaps the first to coin the term “fire-sale FDI” to describe this phenomenon, but 
several contemporary theoretical and empirical treatments have provided further support to this notion.
6 
Blonigen (1997) advanced our understanding of the link between exchange rates and FDI by proposing a 
theoretical model in which FDI seeks to acquire “firm-specific” assets, and finds support in data on 
Japanese acquisitions of U.S. companies during 1975-1992. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) further pursue 
the hypothesis that FDI in pursuit of mergers and acquisitions increased during liquidity crises (and 
devaluations) experienced by East Asia during 1996-1998 and concluded that this effect was particularly 
prominent in the tradables sector, thus suggesting that FDI might in fact be a stepping stone for the 
recovery of trade after such crises. World Bank observers have taken this literature seriously, and some 
have concluded that we can expect an uptick in FDI in the aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis (see, for 
example, Calderón and Didier 2009).  
  D. Vertical versus Horizontal FDI 
One of the most cited articles in the FDI literature is Carr et al. (2001), which introduced the terms 
“horizontal” and “vertical” multinational enterprises (MNEs). The former refers to MNEs with foreign 
affiliates that sell final goods in the host market, whereas vertical MNEs exploit international differences 
in factor endowments or relative factor costs to export final goods elsewhere. The original motivation for 
these authors was the emergence of the so-called “new trade theory,” which argued that economies of 
scale can explain the rise of intra-industry trade during the second half of the twentieth century. They 
argued that an uncomfortable fact about intra-industry trade was that it was dominated by MNEs. Be that 
as it may, our interest here is solely due to the contrasting predictions regarding trade flows of the two 
motivations for FDI: vertical FDI is more likely to result in new international trade flows, especially 
exports from the host country, whereas horizontal FDI seeks to overcome international trade costs by 
shifting production and sales into the host country. Hence, if exchange rate devaluations affect FDI, the 
nature of this new FDI will thus affect the extent to which exchange-rate changes affect exports in a 
reduced-form model.  
III. Data 
Quarterly data on REERs, FDI and exports of goods and services come from databases maintained by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The REER is defined by the IMF as the trade weighted real exchange 
rate, based on the ratio of indexes of consumer prices between pairs of trading partners.
 7 The series cover 
                                                           
6 Krugman’s paper was widely circulated about three years prior to its publication in an edited volume in 2000. 
However, Blonigen (1997) predated the Krugman’s working paper.  
7 An alternative index of real exchange rates often used in the literature is the ratio of price indexes found in the 
Penn World Tables, in which the United States is the benchmark. However, these data are available only in annual 
frequencies, not quarterly, which might be a significant disadvantage for the empirical analysis in this case. 
However, it is worth noting that using annual averages of the REER index and the annual data from the Penn World  
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the period 1990-2010, ending in the third quarter of 2010. The resulting data set covers 60 countries or 
episodes of large devaluations. An episode of large devaluation was defined as the largest quarter-on-
quarter devaluation of each country’s REER. These data come from the IMF’s information notice system 
(INS). The value of exports of goods and services and the FDI series come from the IMF’s database on 
International Financial and Trade Statistics.  
IV. Stylized Facts 
As a first approach to the data, Figures 1 and 2 present the cross-country averages of the REER, FDI and 
exports variables, normalized so that they equal zero in the quarter of the large devaluation and the units 
are  in  country-specific  standard  deviations.  That  is,  we  subtracted  the  value  of  each  variable  in  the 
relevant quarter and divided the resulting series by each country’s standard deviation of each variable. 
This normalization facilitates the interpretation of these graphs.  
Figure 1 illustrates that the identification of large devaluations resulted in a discrete change in the level of 
the REER before and after the identified maximum devaluations. It is noteworthy that on average during 
the two-year (eight quarters) after each episode the level of the REER was significantly lower than during 
the preceding two years. That is, the approach yields a significant and persistent devaluation treatment, 
which hopefully includes devaluations caused by different reasons across the country episodes rather than 
just  reflecting  episodes  of  devaluations  driven  by  financial  crises,  just  the  type  of  unsystematically 
assigned event suitable for further data analysis. Alternative approaches used in the literature described 
earlier include the use of proxies for undervaluation or simply examine the effects of exchange-rate 
variations on other outcome variables. Both would be problematic for an event-study approach.
8  
Figure 2 presents time-period averages of the normalized FDI and exports variables before and after the 
devaluation episodes, based on data from sub-samples of countries with data for all  periods before and 
after the devaluation, and the list of countries for each sub sample appears in the table in the Appendix.
9 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tables from 1990-2007, the correlation between the two series is 0.73. Putting the frequency of the data aside, the 
Penn World Table variable could be more desirable for future work, because the REER depends solely on prices of 
consumer goods (in each country’s basket of goods used to calculate CPI indexes), whereas in principle the PWT 
index includes consumer goods as well as investment goods and inputs purchased by governments. On the other 
hand, not all countries in the PWT database conduct price surveys, and the PWT includes observations derived from 
imputing techniques.  
8 In addition, the estimation of exchange -rate misalignment is itself a complex undertaking, replete with potential 
pitfalls, because it requires a well specified model of equilibrium exchange rates. For details, see, for example, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007), Rodrik (2008), among others.  Our sample of episodes includes crises that 
could be driven by sudden stops of capital inflows, such as Mexico’s crisis of 1995 and East Asian devaluations 
during the late 1990s, as well as more recent and less sharp devaluations of high-income country currencies during 
2009-2010. Consequently the magnitude of the devaluations vary greatly across countries, but what matters for the 
FDI fire sale effect is that the devaluations are large relative to the behavior of each country’s REER over the longer 
time horizon of 1990-2010. See section  
9 Since the date of each episode varies across countries, and some occurred towards the beginning of the sample 
period or the end, the sample used to calculate these averages changes over the 16 quarters portrayed in the graph. In 
addition, the coverage of the data for each indicator varies across countries. The series averages with the whole 
sample paint a different picture. Exports tend to fall immediately prior to the devaluation, bouncing back after the 
first quarter after the devaluations, and rising steadily thereafter. The FDI series in this sample fall sharply one 
quarter prior to the devaluation, with a small bounce back that coincides with the quarter of the devaluations,  
7 
 
The trends with constant samples in Figure 2 show that average exports were rising but slowing down 
prior to the devaluation, but accelerated markedly three quarters after the devaluation. In contrast, the 
average FDI shows no apparent trend over the period, but it tended to decline for three consecutive 
quarters prior to the devaluation and recovered with an upswing (the largest in the time 17-quarter time 
period) one quarter immediately after the devaluation. But this FDI series averages appears to be mean 
reverting.  
On average, it seems that FDI surges after large devaluations, i.e., after t0 in the graph, anticipate upticks 
in exports, especially in the constant sample. Readers can easily calculate the standard deviations of the 
corresponding  surges,  due  to the normalization  of the  variables.  However,  the  potential  existence  of 
trends in the series prior to devaluation (downward in the average FDI prior to devaluation with the whole 
sample, and upwards in the export series with the constant sample) implies that further econometric 
exercises need to control for trends in the series in order to assess the correlation between leads and lags 
of these series. We return to econometric issues in Section V below.  
Table  1  summarizes  the  data  around  the  episodes  of  large  devaluations.  It  classifies  each  country 
experience in terms of the timing and magnitude of the FDI or export surges. The notes at the bottom of 
the table provide the percentage of the 60 cases that experienced FDI surges – defined as an increase that 
is above the 75
th percentile of the distribution of such changes within countries – prior to export surges 
and vice versa. The sample is evenly divided into both types of episodes. It is noteworthy, however, that 
the same exercise but using a lower threshold of the 60
th instead of the 75
th percentile yielded a higher 
share of episodes with surges in FDI that was higher than the share of episodes with export surges 
preceding FDI surges.
10 Hence it seems that there is notable international heterogeneity in terms of the 
timing of surges, but FDI surges are at least as frequent as export surges. The following section discusses 
econometric estimates that provide admittedly speculative evidence about whether the correlations 
between leads and lags of the three variables are partially statistically  significant, which can also be 
interpreted as an assessment of whether the magnitude of REER, FDI and export fluctuations around the 
time of the large devaluations affected the magnitude of FDI and export surges.  
V. Econometric Estimations 
How are the stylized facts related to the literatures discussed in section II? Recall that the FDI fire sale 
effect should imply that devaluations are followed by surges in FDI, which can be transitory, because the 
literature views this effect as opportunistic behavior by foreign investors waiting for the right moment to 
buy host-country domestic assets at relatively cheap prices, and this is relative to each country’s REER 
trends. Also, the fire sale effect implies that exports should follow FDI increases in countries where FDI 
is vertically motivated, but not so much if it is horizontal. Finally, if devaluations have a direct effect on 
exports by changing the relative prices of exports in importing countries, then exports should follow 
fluctuations in REERs. These predictions are more likely to be valid after the devaluations, precisely 
because the fire sale effect would be detected only after the large devaluation and not necessarily before. 
Hence the models were also estimated with ex-post data only, in which case the estimated effect of the 
REER on the other two variables will be probably driven by the large devaluation episode and perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
followed by a mean reverting process thereafter but with the sharpest surges occurring between the first and third 
quarters after the devaluation.  
10 These results are available upon request.   
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attenuated by the less dramatic REER fluctuations that follow the selected large devaluations – see Figure 
1 above. 
The econometric exercises presented below are perhaps the most speculative portion of this note and relay 
on the time series processes of each variable. For each variable, the estimations focus on the effect of 
lagged REER, FDI and exports on FDI and exports. The dynamic versions of the models also include the 
lagged dependent variable. These dynamic models could be interpreted as Granger causality tests if there 
were no omitted relevant explanatory variables. Of course, this assumption is hopelessly weak, and hence 
these  exercises  remain  speculative  in  nature.  However,  the  specifications  do  control  for  country 
characteristics that did not vary during the 17-quarter period around the episodes of large devaluations, as 
well as quarter-specific effects that are common across countries for each variable. At best, these are 
descriptive analyses aiming to identify partial correlations among the three variables of interest.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the regression results. The former includes all observations in the data set; the 
latter uses only observations from developing countries that exclude OECD high-income countries. Both 
tables follow the same structure: The first two columns correspond to a static and a dynamic model of 
FDI, followed by the models of exports. The last four columns in both tables show results for the post-
devaluation period only. The expectation is that horizontal FDI is more common among high-income 
economies, and thus the correlation between lagged FDI and exports should be less significant in Table 2, 
which includes these countries in the estimation sample. Similarly, the ex-post models are expected to 
show more significant effects of the REER on both variables, because that is the period that follows the 
deliberately chosen large devaluations (at time t=0). Finally, both sets of results were estimated with 
country fixed effects and quarter-specific effects. The country effects allow us to interpret the results as 
the effect of deviations from the country mean of the explanatory variable on the dependent variables, 
which approximate the effect of changes of the explanatory variables.
11 The units of the variables are still 
the normalized variables, and thus readers can easily perform thought experi ments about the economic 
magnitude of the coefficients.  
For the whole sample of 60 countries, lagged exports appear with a significant and positive coefficient as 
determinants of FDI. However, in columns 3 and 4, lagged FDI appears as a significant determ inant of 
exports. Both variables seem to experience a bit of persistence as evidenced by the significance of the 
lagged dependent variables in each model. Perhaps more importantly, in these models (columns 1 -4 in 
Table 2) the lagged REER is not a significant determinant of either FDI or exports.  
Continuing with Table 2, the estimations of the ex-post models presented in columns 5-6 suggest lagged 
exports continued to be significant as a determinant of subsequent FDI to a larger extent than prior to the 
devaluation, because the corresponding coefficients are significantly larger than under columns 1 and 2. 
The lagged REER is now significant and with the expected negative sign (i.e., increases in the REER are 
appreciations) in the dynamic FDI model (column 6) but not in any other model.  
                                                           
11 Controlling for country fixed effects by de-meaning instead of differences is preferable in this context, because the 
coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is  biased  downwards  to  a  lesser  extent.  The  bias  is  inversely 
proportional to the number of observations by country, which are close to 17 in this application (i.e., 8 quarters 
before and after plus the quarter of the large devaluation). In contrast, the bias in the differenced models is not 
diluted by the number of time periods.   
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The results for developing countries in Table 3 tell a slightly more robust story. The REER becomes 
significant and with the expected negative sign in the ex-post models of FDI as expected (columns 5 and 
6 of Table 3). In turn, exports appear significantly related to lagged FDI in the static and dynamic models 
of ex-post exports (columns 7 and 8 in Table 3). The levels of significance are not overwhelming, but this 
is expected given the low number of countries (38) in this sample. It is worth noting that the magnitude of 
the lagged REER coefficient in the FDI models tends to be larger in this sample than in the whole sample 
that includes high-income countries, and the estimated coefficient of lagged FDI on exports tends to be 
larger and more significant than in the equivalent specifications with the global sample. This is expected, 
because high-income countries tend to receive higher shares of horizontal FDI than developing countries.  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This note started by acknowledging that the interest in the role of exchange rates in determining trade 
flows has risen in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09, and noted that the existing 
literature includes studies that find small effects of exchange rates on trade flows. In addition, it noted that 
there is another literature linking exchange rate fluctuations with FDI, with the term “FDI fire sale” often 
appearing in the literature. This note speculates that the link between exchange rates and exports might be 
intermediated by the response of FDI, which can be either horizontal or vertical, with the latter tending to 
raise exports from the receiving countries. Developing countries are thought to receive proportionately 
more of this type of FDI than rich countries.  
The empirical analyses that followed were speculative, but provided a bit of evidence about the behavior 
of  FDI  and  exports  before  and  after  large  devaluations,  which  were  defined as  the  largest quarterly 
devaluation of the REER for each country. If there is one word that characterizes these episodes, it should 
be “heterogeneity.” We found an equal number of episodes with FDI surges preceding export surges after 
large devaluations as the number of episodes with export surges leading FDI.  
The simplistic regressions discussed above further highlighted the potential for future research on the 
relationship between exchange rates, FDI and exports. As expected, the results were weak but more 
robust in the sample of developing countries, which suggested that REER devaluations tend to raise FDI, 
and FDI and exports appear to feed on each other. These results probably suffer from omitted variable 
bias, as the empirical models did not control for much else except country and period fixed effects. Still, 
future research could pursue more parsimonious econometric strategies to help us identify the effect of 
exchange rate fluctuations on both FDI and exports. Extending the existing literature on exchange rates 
and FDI with micro data at the firm level by examining mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors and 
subsequent exports around episodes of devaluations could also be fruitful.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Large Devaluations: Average Normalized REER before and after Selected Episodes 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF. See text for details. 
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Figure 2. FDI and Exports before and after Large Devaluations 
(constant sample, see appendix table for list of countries) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF. See text for details. 
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Table 1. Episodes of Large Devaluations and the Timing and Magnitude of FDI and Export Surges 
(quarterly data, 1990-2010) 
   REER  Devaluation 
Timing of first increase 
above the 75 centile 
(quarters after) 
Growth rate of first 
increase above the 
75 centile 
Country  Year  Qtr 
Growth 
Rate  Exports  FDI  FDI first?*  Exports  FDI 
Argentina  2002  1  -0.54  1  6  C  0.19  0.69 
Austria  2010  2  -0.02     0  A     0.61 
Bangladesh  1996  3  -0.23  0  3  C  0.23  3.87 
Belarus  1999  1  -0.37  1  0  A  0.16  3.04 
Belgium  2010  2  -0.03        D       
Bolivia  2009  2  -0.08  4  1  A  0.18  1.56 
Brazil  1999  1  -0.33  1  2  C  0.23  0.58 
Bulgaria  1996  2  -0.26  3  1  A  1.17  0.80 
Canada  2008  4  -0.10  3  2  A  0.08  4.03 
Chile  2008  2  -0.10  4  1  A  0.12  2.36 
Hong Kong, 
China  1998  4  -0.06  2  6  C  0.15  0.86 
Colombia  1999  3  -0.13  0  2  C  0.10  0.43 
Costa Rica  2009  2  -0.06  0     C  0.08    
Denmark  1993  3  -0.04  1  3  C  0.11  0.32 
Ecuador  1999  1  -0.29  1  3  C  0.12  0.96 
Ethiopia  1992  4  -0.54  1     C  0.40    
Fiji  2009  2  -0.19  1  1  B  0.39  0.76 
Finland  1993  1  -0.11  3  1  A  0.15  1.19 
France  2010  2  -0.04        D       
Georgia  1998  4  -0.13  2  0  A  0.65  1.30 
Germany  1991  1  -0.16  3  3  B  0.14  2.72 
Guatemala  1990  3  -0.21  2  3  C  0.19  0.48 
Hungary  2009  1  -0.11  3  1  A  0.18  11.51 
Iceland  2008  4  -0.17  3     C  0.24    
India  1991  3  -0.18  2  0  A  0.17  0.58 
Indonesia  1998  1  -0.37  5  0  A  0.15  0.55 
Ireland  1993  1  -0.09  1  0  A  0.06  1.90 
Israel  2002  2  -0.07  2  3  C  0.08  5.73 
Italy  1995  1  -0.09  1  0  A  0.09  1.59 
Japan  1995  3  -0.15  7  3  A  0.06  12.44 
Jordan  2009  2  -0.04     0  A     2.10 
Korea, Rep.  1997  4  -0.34  4  2  A  0.14  1.31 
Lithuania  1995  2  -0.08  0  4  C  0.18  0.67 
Luxembourg  2010  2  -0.03        D       
Mexico  1995  1  -0.36  0  1  C  0.11  0.47 
Mongolia  2009  1  -0.17  1  2  C  0.37  1.73  
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Nepal  1991  3  -0.12  1     C  0.40    
Netherlands  2010  2  -0.03        D       
New 
Zealand  2008  4  -0.10  2  4  C  0.15  1.11 
Norway  2008  4  -0.12  3  2  A  0.11  15.53 
Pakistan  1998  3  -0.13  5  7  C  0.13  1.00 
Panama  1998  4  -0.06  4  0  A  0.11  2.31 
Papua New 
Guinea  1999  2  -0.10  0  2  C  0.21  25.96 
Philippines  1997  3  -0.14  4  2  A  0.33  1.77 
Poland  2008  4  -0.14  3  3  B  0.10  0.72 
Portugal  1993  2  -0.03  2  1  A  0.12  1.28 
Russian 
Federation  1998  3  -0.38  5  1  A  0.27  2.11 
Singapore  1998  3  -0.05  3  2  A  0.13  16.49 
Slovenia  2009  2  -0.16  2     C  0.11    
South Africa  2001  4  -0.22  2  7  C  0.22  3.24 
Spain  1993  2  -0.08  0  4  C  0.15  0.59 
Sri Lanka  1994  2  -0.07  0  6  C  0.16  4.19 
Sweden  1992  4  -0.15  4  5  C  0.13  3.04 
Thailand  1997  3  -0.24  7  2  A  0.08  0.89 
Turkey  2001  1  -0.27  1  0  A  0.10  2.62 
United 
Kingdom  2008  4  -0.15  2  2  B  0.06  0.83 
United 
States  2009  2  -0.07  2  0  A  0.11  7.58 
Uruguay  2002  3  -0.29  3  2  A  0.31  1.26 
Vanuatu  1995  2  -0.10  1     C  0.24    
Venezuela 
Rep. Bol.  1994  2  -0.25  0  6  C  0.28  0.62 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF. See text for details. 
 
*Notes: A = The increase in FDI occurred first or there was an increase in FDI but not in Exports: 43.33% 
B = The increase in FDI and the increase in Exports occurred in the same quarter: 6.67% 
C = The increase in Exports occurred first or there was an increase in Exports but not in FDI: 43.33% 
D = There was not an increase in FDI or in Exports: 6.67%   
 
 
    
 
Table 2. Regression Results: The Magnitude of Devaluations, FDI and Exports 
(whole sample) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 









                          
Lagged FDI 
 
0.169***  0.0565***  0.0231* 
 
-0.161***  0.0461**  0.0337 
   
(0.0355)  (0.0151)  (0.0126) 
 
(0.0512)  (0.0224)  (0.0216) 
Lagged REER  -0.0202  -0.0130  0.00721  -0.0108  -0.0556  -0.0861*  0.00336  -0.00300 
 
(0.0407)  (0.0403)  (0.0172)  (0.0143)  (0.0517)  (0.0520)  (0.0234)  (0.0225) 
Lagged Exports  0.289***  0.245*** 
 




(0.0864)  (0.0860) 
 
(0.0297)  (0.115)  (0.114) 
 
(0.0460) 
                  Observations  886  882  901  901  445  445  464  464 
R-squared  0.055  0.082  0.129  0.405  0.038  0.063  0.214  0.279 
Number of 
countries  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include period fixed effects and country fixed effects (demeaning approach).  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF. See text for details. 
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Table 3. Regression Results: The Magnitude of Devaluations, FDI and Exports among Developing Countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 









                          
Lagged FDI 
 
0.217***  0.0819***  0.0295 
 
-0.0485  0.0638**  0.0493* 
   
(0.0451)  (0.0208)  (0.0183) 
 
(0.0673)  (0.0305)  (0.0298) 
Lagged REER  -0.0280  -0.0251  -0.00235  -0.0261  -0.100*  -0.105*  -0.0102  -0.0162 
 
(0.0413)  (0.0406)  (0.0190)  (0.0164)  (0.0595)  (0.0599)  (0.0282)  (0.0273) 
Lagged Exports  0.274***  0.196* 
 




(0.105)  (0.105) 
 
(0.0397)  (0.148)  (0.148) 
 
(0.0593) 
                  Observations  576  572  579  579  306  306  313  313 
R-squared  0.048  0.092  0.153  0.375  0.048  0.050  0.188  0.239 
Number of 
countries  38  38  38  38  38  38  38  38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include period fixed effects and country fixed effects (demeaning approach).  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF. See text for details. 
 
 
    
 
Appendix Table: Countries in the Constant Sample of Countries by Indicator 
Exports  
(37 countries) 
FDI (33 countries)  REER (36 countries) 
argentina  argentina  argentina 
bangladesh  bangladesh  bangladesh 
belarus  belarus  belarus 
brazil  brazil  brazil 
bulgaria  bulgaria  bulgaria 
chile  chile  chile 
china_pr_hong_kong     china_pr_hong_kong 
colombia  colombia  colombia 
denmark  denmark  denmark 
ecuador  ecuador  ecuador 
ethiopia  ethiopia  ethiopia 
finland  finland  finland 
georgia     georgia 
indonesia  indonesia  indonesia 
ireland  ireland  ireland 
israel  israel  israel 
italy  italy  italy 
japan  japan  japan 
korea_republic  korea_republic  korea_republic 
lithuania  lithuania    
mexico  mexico  mexico 
pakistan  pakistan  pakistan 
panama     panama 
papua_new_guinea  papua_new_guinea  papua_new_guinea 
philippines  philippines  philippines 
portugal  portugal  portugal 
russian_federation  russian_federation  russian_federation 
singapore  singapore  singapore 
south_africa  south_africa  south_africa 
spain  spain  spain 
sri_lanka  sri_lanka  sri_lanka 
sweden  sweden  sweden 
thailand  thailand  thailand 
turkey  turkey  turkey 
uruguay  uruguay  uruguay 
vanuatu  vanuatu  vanuatu 
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